introduced a novel variant of the learning parity with noise problem and showed that it implies IND-CPA secure public-key cryptography. In this paper we introduce the first public-key encryption-scheme based on this assumption which is IND-CCA secure in the standard model. Our main technical tool to achieve this is a novel all-but-one simulation technique based on the correlated products approach of Rosen and Segev (TCC 2009). Our IND-CCA1 secure scheme is asymptotically optimal with respect to ciphertext-expansion. To achieve IND-CCA2 security we use a technique of Dolev, Dwork and Naor (STOC 1991) based on one-time-signatures. For practical purposes, the efficiency of the IND-CCA2 scheme can be substantially improved by the use of additional assumptions to allow for more efficient signature schemes. Our results make Alekhnovich's variant of the learning parity with noise problem a promising candidate to achieve post quantum cryptography.
Introduction
This paper presents the first IND-CCA2 secure cryptosystem based on a computational assumption first introduced by Michael Alekhnovich in the year 2003 [Ale03] . This assumption essentially states that for a given random linear code C with a constant rate, a random code word with an inverse square root fraction of noise is indistinguishable from a random string. Alekhnovich [Ale03] was able to construct a semantically secure cryptosystem which was based solely on this assumption. It can be seen as an special case of the decisional learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. The decisional LPN problem (henceforth LPN problem), asks to distinguish noisy binary linear equations Ax + e from uniformly random. The problem is parametrized by the number of samples provided (i.e the number of rows of A) and the amount of noise (i.e. the distribution of e). While most cryptographic constructions based on LPN (e.g. [HB01, JW05, KSS10] ) use the standard parameter-choice of a polynomial number of samples and a constant fraction of noise, Alekhnovich's LPN problem uses a linear number of samples and an inverse square root fraction of noise. These two parameter-choices are apparently incomparable. On one side, providing a larger amount of samples makes the problem apparently easier. On the other side, a larger amount of noise seems to make the problem harder. Nevertheless, Alekhnovich's parameter choice seems to yield the stronger assumption, as constructing a public key cryptosystem from LPN with a constant fraction of noise remains an important open problem.
LPN assumptions are of a more combinatorial nature and seem incomparable to the algebraic assumptions needed for the McEliece cryptosystem. For the security of the McEliece cryptosystem one has to additionally assume that scrambled Goppa-codes are computationally indistinguishable from random linear codes [McE78, BS08, NIKM08, DMQN09] . Moreover, though there is a syntactic similarity to the learning with errors (LWE) problem, LPN and LWE also seem rather incomparable. LWE asks to distinguish a polynomial number noisy linear equations over Z q (for a polynomial sized q), where the error-distribution is euclidean, from uniformly random. IND-CCA2 encryption schemes based on LWE [PW08, Pei09, MP12] use properties that are very specific to LWE (e.g. short dual-lattice bases) and not available in the binary domain. It has been open for nine years if an IND-CCA2 secure scheme could be built from Alekhnovich's LPN problem. In this paper we present such a IND-CCA2 secure scheme which is based on the all-but-one approach [DDN00, PW08, RS09] . The new construction is asymptotically optimal for IND-CCA1 security. It has only a constant factor ciphertext-expansion and the ciphertexts are of size O(k 2/(1−2 ) ), where k is the security parameter and a small constant. To achieve IND-CCA2 security we use a generic transformation based on one-time-signatures [DDN00] . A more efficient construction is possible using additional assumptions yielding more efficient signature schemes. The trapdoor of our scheme is substantially different from Alekhnovich's original construction, but bears some similarities with the above-mentioned lattice-based constructions. It allows witness recovery and decryption with incomplete keys, which is necessary for applying the all-but-one approach. Different from [PW08, RS09, Pei09, DMQN09] we do not achieve the all-but-one property by repeatedly encrypting the same ciphertext or a correlated product. We employ a bitwise decryption and use error correction to cope with incomplete decryptions. The novel all-but-one simulation technique employed in this construction allows for a significant improvement in efficiency compared with previous constructions. While this new technique might be of interest in lattice-based cryptography, we see no obvious way to make use of our technique in McEliece-based constructions. Crucial to our technique is the ability to recover individual bits of a plaintext from the ciphertext using a partial secret key. This, however, seems out of reach for constructions based on the McEliece assumption.
Related Work. Ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) security [RS91] is one of the strongest known notions of security for public key encryption schemes (PKE). Many computational assumptions have been used in the literature for obtaining cryptosystems meeting this security notion. Given one-way trapdoor permutations, CCA2 security can be obtained from any semantically secure public key cryptosystem [NY90, Sah99, Lin03] . Efficient constructions are also known based on number-theoretic assumptions [CS98, CS03, HK09] , lattice-based assumptions [PW08, Pei09, MP12] , the McEliece assumption [DMQN09] or identity based encryption schemes [CHK04] .
Preliminaries

Coding-Theory
We need a few coding-theoretic facts and constructions for our schemes and proofs. We denote the finite field with q elements by F q . The hamming-weight |x| of a vector x ∈ F n q is the number of its non-zero locations. The q-ary entropy function is defined as
It assumes its maximum at α = 1 − 1/q with H q (1 − 1/q) = 1. The volume Vol q (αn, n) of the hamming-ball of radius αn in F n q can be bounded by
Random Codes and the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. The Gilbert-Varshamov bound guarantees the existence of q-ary codes with almost maximal relative minimumdistance 1 − 1/q. Moreover, with high probability, randomly chosen codes enjoy this property. Let n, d, k ∈ N and λ > 0. If it holds that k ≤ n − log q Vol q (d, n) − λn, then the code C(G) generated by a uniformly chosen matrix G ∈ F n×k q has minimum-distance at least d, except with probability q −λn . Therefore, if δ < 1 − 1/q it holds that n − log q Vol q (δn, n) ≥ (1 − H q (δ))n =: ζn. Thus, if k ≤ ζn/2, a uniformly random chosen matrix G ∈ F n×k q generates a code C(G) with minimum-distance at least δn, except with probability q −ζn/2 .
Asymptotically good codes with efficient error-correction. The decryption algorithm of our scheme will introduce errors in the plaintext when decrypting. We will therefore use asymptotically good error-correcting codes C with efficient error-correction algorithm Decode C to encode plaintexts. Prominent examples of such codes are binary expander-codes [SS96, Zém01] : There exists an explicit family of binary linear codes {C n } of constant rate R arbitrarily close to 1 that can efficiently correct an α-fraction of errors, for a constant α > 0.
Bernoulli Distributions and Bounds
In this section we will briefly gather some facts about low-noise Bernoulli distributions. While Alekhnovich's [Ale03] original proposal used a noise distribution that samples vectors of low-weight t uniformly at random, we will use Bernoullidistributions where each bit of a vector is 1 with probability t/n and otherwise 0. The advantage of Bernoulli-distributions over the former distribution is that all components are independent of one another. We will take advantage of this fact when bounding the hamming-weight of matrix-vector products when the matrix is chosen from a Bernoulli distribution. The decryption-algorithm of Alekhnovich's and our encryption-scheme computes inner-products of Bernoullidistributed vectors. To ensure that the inner-product of two Bernoulli-distributed vectors is 0 with high probability, we need to choose the bit-flip probability ρ below a 1/ √ n amount. If ρ is too big (e.g. constant), then the distribution of the inner-product would be statistically close to uniform and our decryptionapproach would fail. Finally, we show that matrices X chosen from a componentwise low-noise Bernoulli distribution enjoy (with high probability) the property, that a product Xs has low-hamming-weight, for any vector s with sufficiently small hamming-weight. We will call such matrices good, and we will use this property for proving correctness of our schemes and in the proof of IND-CCA1 security.
Bernoulli distributions. For a noise-parameter ρ, we write χ ρ for the Bernoullidistribution that outputs 1 with probability ρ and 0 with probability 1 − ρ. The distribution of the hamming-weight of a vector of n iid distributed Bernoullidistributed random variables is the binomial distribution B ρ,n . Throughout the paper, we frequently need to bound Binomial distributions. For this we require two different Chernoff bounds. Let x be distributed by χ n ρ .
It holds for any
2. It holds for any 0
Distributions of inner products. For the decryption-algorithms of our schemes we require that the inner-product of a Bernoulli-distributed vector x and a vector s of small hamming weight is 0 with probability bounded away from 1/2. We will thus show that the probability of the inner-product being 1 is sub-constant for a proper choice of ρ. Let s ∈ F n 2 be a fixed vector and x be distributed by χ n ρ . By a simple XOR-Lemma, it holds that
for some constant > 0 and |s| < γρn for some constant γ > 0, we get the following estimate for ρ . By the mean-value-theorem it holds for any p in the interval (0, e −1 ) that e −ep ≤ 1 − p, therefore we get
The last term is sub-constant in n, i.e. ρ (n) = o(1). This means that for sufficiently large n ρ is arbitrarily small.
Multiplication with random matrices. We will now give bounds for how much the hamming weight of a vector s increases when multiplied with a matrix X ∈ F If l = Ω(n) and β > 0 it holds that
Definition 1. Fix a constant β and = (n). We shall call a matrix X ∈ F l×n 2 (β, )-good, if for all s ∈ F n 2 with |s| < n it holds that |Xs| ≤ βl. The above now implies that for ρ = O(n −1/2− ), any fixed β, γ > 0 and sufficiently large n, a matrix X sampled from χ l×n ρ is (β, γρ)-good with overwhelming probability in n.
Public Key Encryption
This Section is only meant to provide reference for the standard notions of security for encryption schemes and can be safely skipped. Let k be a security parameter. A standard-requirement for public key encryption is correctness.
Definition 3. We say that PKE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is correct, if it holds for all plaintexts m that
The three security notions for public key encryption we are concerned with in this paper are IND-CPA, IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2 security. Let A be an adversary.
Experiment: IND-CPA.
-Generate a pair of keys (pk, sk) = KeyGen(1 k ). Run A on input pk. 
Definition 4. For X ∈ {CP A, CCA1, CCA2}, we say that the scheme PKE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is IND-X secure, if it holds for every PPT-adversary
A that Adv IND-X (A) = | Pr[IND-X(A) = 1] − 1/2| ≤ negl(k).
One-Time Signatures
We also briefly recall the definition of one-time signatures [Lam79] . Let k be a security parameter. We require one-time signature schemes to be correct.
Definition 6. We say that SIG = (Gen, Sign, Verify) is correct, if it holds for all messages m that
Moreover, we require existential unforgeability under one-time chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA security), specified by the following experiment. Let A be an adversary. EUF-CMA secure one-time signature schemes can be constructed from any oneway function [Lam79] .
The Hardness-Assumption
The basic problem we will base the security of our scheme upon is a variant of the decisional learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. Roughly speaking, the LPN problem asks to distinguish a number of noisy samples of a linear function (specified by a secret vector x) from uniform random. The variant considered here differs from the standard LPN problem in two aspects. First, the distinguisher is provided only linear number of samples, rather than an arbitrary polynomial number. Second, the noise-level in this variant is significantly lower than in the standard LPN problem. While the standard LPN problem comes with an errordistribution that flips each output-bit with a small, but constant probability, for this variant the probability is sub-constant. More precisely, we will work with a bit-flip probability of the order O(n −1/2− ) for some small constant . Here, n is the size of the secret x in bits. Problem 1. Let n ∈ N be a problem parameter, m = O(n) and > 0 and
be chosen uniformly at random, x ∈ F n 2 be chosen uniformly at random and e according to χ m ρ . The problem is, given A and y, to decide whether y is distributed according to Ax+e or chosen uniformly at random.
Currently, the best classical algorithms to attack Problem 1 require time of the order 2
are no quantum algorithms known performing significantly better than the best classical algorithms. In our constructions we will choose n by n = O(k 2/(1−2 ) ), where k is the security parameter. This normalizes the hardness of Problem 1 to 2
In the full version of this paper, we provide a reduction establishing the hardness of problem 1 based on the hardness-assumption used in [Ale03] , which uses a different error-distribution. It will be necessary to use a normal-form (as in [ACPS09] ) of Problem 1 in our cryptographic constructions, which is stated in Problem 2. In this normal-form, the secret x is drawn from the noise-distribution χ
be chosen uniformly at random, x be distributed according to χ n ρ and e be distributed according to χ m ρ . The problem is, given A and y, to decide whether y is distributed according to Ax+e or chosen uniformly at random.
The hardness of Problem 2 can be established by a simple reduction from Problem 1, given in the full version of this paper. By a simple hybrid-argument, it follows that that a matrix-version of problem 2 is also hard.
be chosen uniformly at random, T ∈ F In the security-proof for our schemes, we will use Problem 3 to establish pseudorandomness of the public keys, while we use Problem 2 to establish pseudorandomness of the ciphertexts.
Outline of the Techniques
In this Section, we will outline the techniques used to construct an IND-CCA1 secure scheme based on the hardness of Problem 2 and Problem 3. We will provide the full presentation in the subsequent sections. Let henceforth ρ = O(n −1/2− ) for a small constant > 0. We will start with a rough outline of a scheme that encrypts single bits and has a substantial decryption-error. On a technical level, this first building block resembles the schemes of Regev [Reg05] and the Dual-Regev Scheme of Gentry et al. [GPV08] (which both live in the LWE realm). Public keys for our scheme are
is chosen uniformly at random and b 
. By the properties of the distribution χ ρ , the error-term v = x T s + e 2 − t T e 1 is 0 with probability bounded away from 1/2, i.e. it holds y = m with substantial probability.
This decryption-error can be dealt with by encoding m (which is now a bitvector of length n) using an error-correcting code as follows. Let G ∈ F . The secret key is T . Messages m ∈ F n 2 are encrypted as c = (As + e 1 , Bs + e 2 + Gm), with s, e 1 , e 2 sampled from the corresponding χ ρ distributions. Decryption computes y = c 2 − T c 1 = Gm + Xs + e 2 − T e 1 . Since the matrices T and X were chosen from a χ ρ distribution, they are good (as defined in Section 2.2) with overwhelming probability. Thus the error-term v = Xs + e 2 − T e 1 has a low hamming-weight and we can use the decoding-procedure of C to recover m. The IND-CPA security of this scheme follows easily by the hardness of Problem 2 and Problem 3. However, we will require a witness-recovering IND-CPA scheme for the construction of our IND-CCA scheme. A scheme is witness recovering if the decryption recovers the randomness used to encrypt. For the above scheme however, the vector s is "lost" during decryption. We circumvent this problem by using some sort of key-encapsulation. Instead of encrypting a plaintext-vector m using the above scheme, we encrypt the witness s (which has the same size as m). We will then use another instance of Problem 2 to encrypt the plaintext m (using s as symmetric key). Encrypting the witness s instead of m will not harm security. By Problem 3, the matrix B is pseudorandom. Therefore, the matrix B + G is also pseudorandom. Thus, the second part of the ciphertext c 2 = Bs + e 2 + Gs = (B + G)s + e 2 is also pseudorandom by Problem 2. Observe that we do not need the entire secret key T to recover s from a ciphertext c. Let y = c 2 − T c 1 = Gs + Xs + e 2 − T e 1 . To recover the i-th component y i of y, we merely need the i-th row t T i of the matrix T . If we posses a sufficient amount of the rows of T , yet not all of them, we can still recover s by computing y i for all the i for which t T i is known and setting y i = ⊥ (erasure) otherwise. We can now recover s by performing a combined error-and erasurecorrection on y using the decoding algorithm of C. If it is guaranteed that the number of erasures is very low, we can simply set all erasures to random values (thereby introducing a few additional random errors) and use the standard decoding-algorithm Decode C of C. Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] recently used a very similar witness-recovering mechanism in their construction of an improved LWE-based IND-CCA2 scheme. While our construction uses off-the-shelf binary error-correcting codes to encode the witness s, they needed to construct a special family of lattices for this purpose. These lattices have a short dual basis and an efficient decoding algorithm, thus they can be seen as a euclidean analogue to efficiently decodable error-correcting codes with large minimum distance. We can now give an outline of our IND-CCA1 construction. It is an adoption of the all-but-one simulation-paradigm [PW08, RS09] to the special structure of our CPA scheme. The key-generation samples not just one, but q (for a constant q) matrices B 1 , . . . , B q and T 1 , . . . , T q . Encryption first samples a tag τ , then derives an instance-public-key B τ from B 1 , . . . , B q . It further proceeds as the INC-CPA variant using the matrix B τ instead of B. The ciphertext is (τ, c) . Decryption takes the tag τ , derives an instance secret-key T τ and uses T τ to decrypt c. After recovering the random coins it checks whether they suffice a certain hamming-weight criterium. If not, it aborts, otherwise it outputs the plaintext m. The instance-key derivation will assemble the matrix B τ by picking certain rows from the matrices B 1 , . . . , B q depending on the tag τ . In the security proof, there will be a single tag τ * for which the simulator is completely oblivious of the instance-secret key T τ * (this is the tag where the IND-CPA challenge will be embedded). For all other tags, the simulator needs to be able to simulate a decryption-oracle. This means that no other instance-secret-key T τ should share too many rows with T τ * . If this is the case, the simulator will be able to use an incomplete secret key to answer decryption-queries by the above observation. To guarantee that the instance-secret-keys T τ have small overlap with one another, we will use a q-ary error-correcting encoding for the tags τ . This simulation-strategy requires that the hamming-weight of the ciphertextnoise satisfies a certain bound, otherwise the simulator is unable to correct the additional erasure caused by the incomplete secret key. This is the reason why the decryption needs to check the hamming-weight of the witnesses. The IND-CCA2 construction is obtained by replacing the randomly chosen tags τ with the verification keys of a one-time signature scheme and appending an according signature to the ciphertext. This transformation has been used in several contexts to obtain CCA2 secure encryption from different primitives [DDN00, CHK04, PW08, RS09, DMQN09]. The encryption primitives admitting such a transformation can be generalized under the notion of tag-based encryption schemes [Kil06] .
The IND-CPA Scheme
In this Section we will provide the full construction of an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme. We will use this scheme in the construction of our CCA1 secure scheme. Let k be a security parameter, n ∈ O(k 2/(1−2 ) ), l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ∈ O(k 2/(1−2 ) ) and
be the generator-matrix of a binary linear error-correcting code C and Decode C an efficient decoding procedure for C that corrects up to αl 2 errors (for a constant α). Further let D ⊆ F We will now show that this scheme is correct, i.e. the probability that a decryption-error occurs is negligible in k.
Lemma 1. The scheme PKE 1 is correct.
Proof. Decryption only fails if one of the two decoding operations fails. We will thus bound the probability of failure for both decoding operations. It holds that
Thus, it is sufficient to bound the hamming-weight of the error-term v = X · s + e 2 − T · e 1 . Fix constants β, γ > 0 such that 2β + γρ < α and γρ < λ. By a Chernoff-bound, it holds that |s| < γρn, e 1 < γρl 1 , e 2 < γρl 2 and e 3 < γρl 3 with overwhelming probability in k. The decoding procedure Decode C can correct up to αl 2 errors. With overwhelming probability in k, both matrices X and T are (β, γρ)-good (see Section 2.2). Thus it holds that |Xs| < βl 2 and |T e 1 | < βl 2 (for sufficiently large k). All together, it holds that
Therefore, the decoding-procedure Decode C will successfully recover s. Moreover, Decode D will successfully recover m as |e 3 | < γρ · l 3 < λl 3 .
We now turn to proof IND-CPA security of the scheme PKE 1 .
Theorem 1. Assume that Problem 2 is hard. Then the scheme PKE 1 is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. Let A be PPT-bounded IND-CPA adversary against PKE 1 . Consider the following sequence of games.
-Game 1: This is the IND-CPA experiment.
-Game 2: This is the same as game 1, except that during key-generation, the matrix B is chosen uniformly at random by the experiment. 
The IND-CCA1 Scheme
In this Section, we will construct an IND-CCA1 scheme based on the scheme PKE 1 constructed in the last section. We will extend the encryption and decryption algorithms with an instance-key derivation step, that assigns a tag to each ciphertext and derives an instance public or secret key for each tag. These instance-keys will be used as keys for PKE 1 . Moreover, we need to ensure that decryption only outputs a plaintext if an incomplete key would have already been sufficient to decrypt. Decryption therefore checks if the hamming-weight of the randomness used to encrypt is small enough. When the scheme is used honestly, this is the case with overwhelming probability. As in the last section, let k be a security parameter,
be the generator-matrix of a binary linear error-correcting code C and Decode C an efficient decoding procedure that corrects up to αl 2 errors (for a constant α). Let D ⊆ F l3 2 be a binary errorcorrecting code with efficient encoding Encode D and error-correction Decode D as before. Let E ⊆ Σ l2 be a q-ary code over the alphabet Σ (with q = |Σ|) with relative minimum-distance δ and dimension n. Such a code can be generated randomly (see Section 2.1). We will now explain how the parameters δ and q must be chosen. Recall that Decode C corrects up to αl 2 errors. As explained earlier, α must be big enough to correct the decryption-error, which has hamming-weight less than (2β + γρ)l 2 (for any constant β > 0). As the additional error induced by erasures will have hamming weight ≤ (1 − δ)l 2 , it is sufficient to choose δ (which must be smaller than 1 − 1/q) such that 2β + γρ + 1 − δ < α. As we can choose β and γ arbitrarily small, we can always find q and δ such that the above is met. Therefore, fix β, γ, q and δ such that for sufficiently large n it holds that 2β + γρ + 1 − δ < α. We can choose the constant β arbitrarily small and it holds that γρ ∈ o(1). There exist constructions of efficiently decodable linear codes C such that α is slightly larger than 1/400 [Zém01] . Thus we can choose q as small as q > 1/(α − 2β − γρ) > 400. We remark that this might be drastically improved if a more sophisticated joint error-and-erasure correction mechanism than ours was used. Our naive mechanism simply treats erasures as errors, but there might be much more efficient mechanism, maybe allowing to choose q as small as 2.
Construction 2. The scheme PKE 2 = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is specified by
and C ∈ F Correctness of PKE 2 follows immediately from the correctness of PKE 1 . The only additional step is the check of the hamming weights |s|, |e 1 |, |e 2 | and |e 3 |. However, this has been dealt with implicitly in Lemma 1. We will now prove IND-CCA1 security for the scheme PKE 2 .
Theorem 2. The scheme PKE 2 is IND-CCA1 secure, provided that the scheme PKE 1 is IND-CPA secure and the parameters α, β, γ, q and δ suffice δ < 1 − 1/q and 2β + γρ + 1 − δ < α.
Proof. Let A be PPT-bounded IND-CPA adversary against PKE 2 . Consider the following sequence of games. In game 2, the event that A sends a decryption-query with tag τ * has probability at most f (k)/q n = negl(k), where f (k) is a polynomial upper bound for the number of decryption-queries A makes. If this event does not occur, game 1 and game 2 are identically distributed from A's view. Thus, from A's view game 1 and game 2 are statistically indistinguishable. We will now show that game 2 and game 3 are statistically indistinguishable from A's view. First, assume that for every tag τ the matrices Tτ and Xτ are (β, γρ)-good. If this is the case, we claim that the decryption oracles of game 2 and game 3 behave identical. We split the claim in two cases. The first case is simple: If either |s| ≥ γρn, |e 1 | ≥ γρl 1 , |e 2 | ≥ γρl 2 or |e 3 | ≥ γρl 3 , then the decryption oracle will return ⊥ in both games, regardless whether decoding fails or not. In the other case it holds that |s| < γρn, |e 1 | < γρl 1 , |e 2 | < γρl 2 and |e 3 | < γρl 3 . Now it holds that the hamming-weight of the error-term v = Xτ · s + e 2 − Tτ · e 1 will be bounded by 2βl 2 + γρl 2 . Thus, in game 2 the decoding-algorithm Decode C has to correct at most (2β + γρ)l 2 < αl 2 and will thus be successful and output the unique s. In game 3, there might be up to (1 − δ)l 2 additional errors Decode C has to deal with, as the decryption oracle chooses up to (1 − δ)l 2 components of the codeword y at random. However, since (2β + γρ + 1 − δ)l 2 < αl 2 the decodingalgorithm Decode C will also succeed in game 3 and output the unique s. This concludes the claim. What remains to show for this part of the proof is that, with overwhelming probability in k, it holds that for every tag τ the matrices Tτ and Xτ are (β, γρ)-good. We can think of each matrix Tτ as a row-sub-matrix of a large matrix T full ∈ F ql2×n 2 that consists of all the rows of all T i for i ∈ Σ (i.e. T full is just the vertical concatenation of all T i ). With overwhelming probability in k, T full is (β/q, γρ)-good (since q is constant). This means that for each e 1 with |e 1 | < γρl 1 it holds that |T full e 1 | < β/q · (ql 2 ) = βl 2 . However, as each Tτ is a row-sub-matrix of T full , it also holds that |Tτ e 1 | < βl 2 . Showing that |Xτ s| < βl 2 works analogously, which concludes this part of the proof. Finally, A's advantage of winning game 3 is negligible in k, given that PKE 1 is IND-CPA secure. Assume for contradiction that A wins game 3 with non-negligible advantage ν(k). We will construct an IND-CPA adversary B against PKE 1 that wins the IND-CPA experiment with advantage ν. B's input from the IND-CPA experiment is a public key pk = (A , B , C ) for the scheme PKE 1 . B now runs the key-generation of game 3 with the following modifications. Instead of sampling the matrices A and C uniformly at random, it sets A = A and C = C . Now it generates the B j and T j exactly like the key-generation in game 3. Then however, it replaces the public-key at the locations that constitute Bτ with B , i.e. it sets b 
The IND-CCA2 Scheme
We will now provide details how the scheme PKE 2 can be transformed into an IND-CCA2 secure scheme PKE 3 using additional one-time signatures. We follow an approach by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN00] , which has been used in several other constructions [PW08, Pei09, RS09, DMQN09, MP12], especially in the world of lattice and coding assumptions, to achieve full CCA2 security. First observe that it is not necessary to choose the tag τ ∈ Σ n uniformly at random in the encryption procedure of PKE 2 . We only need to guarantee that a PPT-adversary A will have negligible probability guessing the secret tag τ * correctly if it is granted a polynomial number of trials (this immediately yields the statistical indistinguishability of game 1 and game 2 in Theorem 2). Thus it is sufficient to sample the tags τ from a distribution with high min-entropy. Moreover, observe that the proof of Theorem 2 still holds if we allow A to make decryption-queries even after it has received the challenge-ciphertext c * . This can be seen by noting that the decryption-oracle in game 3 can answer decryption-queries with τ = τ * regardless of whether the challenge-ciphertext has been given to A or not (decryption-queries with τ = τ * are rejected unconditionally). In fact, the decryption-oracle in game 3 is oblivious of whether the challenge-ciphertext has been given to A or not. Thus, the scheme PKE 2 can be recast as a tag-based encryption scheme [Kil06] . We will now outline PKE 3 . Let SIG = (Gen, Sign, Verify) be an EUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme. For simplicity, assume that the verification-keys vk of SIG are elements of Σ n (this can always be accomplished by encoding vk in the q-ary alphabet Σ and choosing n large enough). The key-generation of PKE 3 is identical to the key-generation of PKE 2 . The encryption procedure PKE 3 .Enc first computes a pair of verification and signature-keys (vk, sgk) = SIG.Gen(1 k ). Then it runs the encryption procedure PKE 2 .Enc, with the difference that it sets τ = vk instead of choosing τ uniformly at random. Let c be the output of PKE 2 .Enc. PKE 3 .Enc then computes σ = SIG.Sign sgk (c ) and outputs the ciphertext c = (c , σ). The decryption procedure PKE 3 .Dec first checks if σ is a valid signature on c using the verification-key vk = τ (where τ is the tag given in c ). If the check succeeds, it runs the decryption procedure PKE 2 .Dec on the ciphertext c and outputs whatever PKE 2 .Dec outputs. We summarize this in the following construction. Let Enc pk (m, vk) be a procedure that does exactly the same as PKE 2 .Enc pk (m), but sets τ = vk instead of choosing τ uniformly at random. Proof. (Sketch) Let A be PPT-bounded IND-CCA2 adversary against PKE 3 . It suffices to show that with overwhelming probability, every decryption-query by A tagged with τ * (the tag of the challenge-ciphertext) is rejected. Thus, we can recycle the proof of Theorem 5 almost entirely, we only need to replace the indistinguishability of game 1 and game 2 in the proof of Theorem 2. The rest of the proof is identical. Consider the following two games.
-Game 1: This is the IND-CCA2 experiment. -Game 2: This is the same as game 1, except that the tag τ * of the challengeciphertext c * = (τ * , c * 1 , c * 2 , c * 3 , σ * ) is generated before the experiment starts, and game 2 aborts if A sends a decryption-query with tag τ * .
Assume that A distinguishes between game 1 and game 2 with non-negligible advantage ν(k). Clearly, given that the decryption-oracle rejects every decryptionquery tagged with τ * , both games are identically distributed from A's view. Thus, to distinguish game 1 and game 2 A must generate a decryption-query tagged with τ * that is accepted by the decryption-oracle. This implies that such a decryption-query c = (c , σ) with c = (τ * , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) suffices the condition SIG.Verify vk (c , σ) = 1, where vk = τ * . Thus we can assume that A generates such a decryption-query with probability ν(k). We construct an EUF-CMA adversary B that breaks the EUF-CMA security of SIG with probability ν(k). Clearly, game 2 and the simulation of B are identically distributed from the view of A. Thus, the event that A sends a decryption-query c = (c , σ) with c = (τ * , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) and SIG.Verify vk (c , σ) = 1 happens with probability ν(k) in B's simulation. This means that B outputs a valid forged signature with probability ν(k), contradicting the EUF-CMA security of SIG.
Conclusion
In this work we constructed the first IND-CCA2 secure public key encryption scheme based solely on the hardness of a low-noise variant of the learning parity with noise problem. To achieve this, we introduced a novel all-but-one simulation technique. This new technique enabled the construction of a CCA1 secure scheme, which is more efficient than any previous such construction based on the correlated-products approach. The scheme enjoys a constant-factor ciphertext expansion as well as asymptotically efficient key-generation, encryption and decryption.
